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There is, in the record, testimony tending to support 
the following facts upon which respondent relies in sup-
port of the judgment. 
On or prior to June 12, 1949 a written instrument, 
purporting to be a listing agreement, was executed by the 
plaintiff in his own name and defendant in form as set out 
in plaintiff's amended complaint, the material parts of the 
instrument being: 
"In consideration of your agreement to list the 
property, described on the reverse side of this 
contract, with you during the life hereof, and to 
use your best efforts to find a purchaser therefor, 
I hereby grant you for the period of six months 
from date hereof, the exclusive right to sell or 
exchange said property or any part thereof, at 
the price and terms stated hereon, or at such 
other price, terms or exchange to which I may 
agree. 
"During the life of this contract, if you find 
a buyer who is ready, able and willing to buy said 
property, or any part thereof at said price and 
terms, OR ANY OTHER PRICE OR TERMS TO 
WHICH I MAY AGREE IN WRITING, or if I 
agree to an exchange of said property or any part 
thereof, or if said property or any part thereof 
is sold or exchanged during said term, firm or 
corporation, I agree to pay you $500.00 com-
mission on such sale or exchange, or, if it is sold 
or exchanged within three months after such, 
expiration to any person to whom you have previ-
ously offered it, I agree to pay you the commis-
sion above stated; and in case of the employ-
ment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms 
of this agreement, agree to pay a reasonable 
attorneys fees and all costs of collection. 
Accepted June 12, 1949 by (Signed) 
W. R. Young. 
Dated at Richfield, Utah 19 
(Signed) Ray H. Buchanan, Owner." 
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Nothing appears in the instrument and nothing was 
said by plaintiff at the time of the listing as to whether or 
not he was a real estate broker or real estate salesman 
or otherwise; that Plaintiff was in fact a real estate sales-
man. (Trans, p. 39) Prior to the signing of the sales agree-
ment he had a conversation with a real estate broker, E. H. 
Bardsley as follows: (Trans, p. 56-57) Bardsley testified. 
"I had paid my state license and my bond for my com-
mission. Mr. Young came to the office and wanted to know 
if he could write under my commission. I told him I only 
renewed my license so that the next year if I wanted to 
sell real estate it would only cost me half the price that 
it would if I let pass by, but I didn't intend to make 
any effort to sell real estate during the year 1949 and he 
asked me if he could sell under my license and I told him 
yes, with this understanding that he was to be responsible 
for all sales and that all contracts must go to an attorney, 
that I wasn't to be implicated in any way whatsoever 
through court or otherwise and he was to have all that 
was made as commission." 
It also appears that Bardsley did not renew his license 
after January 1st, 1950. (Trans, p. 50). 
"After the execution of the purported listing agree-
ment and during the year 1949 Mr. Young talked with 
Cecil King a number of times relative to his buying the 
Buchanan place but Mr. King was not interested at the 
price listed $17,500.00 and nothing definite came of it." 
(Trans, p. 13, 14, 15) 
"In the last half of January, 1950 Mr. Young talked 
with Buchanan. Mr. Young testified that he told the de-
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fendant that King was interested in the place but the 
price was too high; that he tried to get King to come. Ray 
asked me to continue my efforts to sell the place at 
$17,500.00 (Trans, p. 19) 
About the 1st to 4th of March, 1950 Ray said tell the 
man (Wegener) We'll take $16,500.00" (Trans, p. 21). 
Young also testified he communicated the information 
to King that the price had been reduced (Trans, p. 22). 
"King said it looked a lot better that he'd take a look at 
it." Young further testified that he took Wegener down 
to look at the place the fore part of March. Ray and his 
wife and Cecil King and his wife were there (Trans, p. 27) 
"I said to Cecil, 'Cecil are you going to buy this place'. He 
said, 'I think I am.' I said remember my listing is still in ef-
fect.' He said, 'I know i t . ' " 
Mr. Buchanan sold the property to Mr. King for 
$16,500.00; $1,000.00 was paid in February 1950 and the 
remaining $15,500.00 when the deed was delivered. 
The following facts are controlling and entitle the 
defendant to a reversal of this case: 
1. The listing was not with a real estate brok-
er, neither in form nor in fact. Neither was it_a_ 
ty* ^^J lgfe 1 *? w i th a real estate salesma^ The contract, 
%*&^YL any, was entered into with W. k. Young person-
\*^~ ally and without reference, either in writing or 
H orally, to any real estate broker or real estate 
salesman. (Trans, p. 39) 
2. Mr. Bardsley when he told Mr. Young that 
Young could write under his license, made it defin-
ite that Mr. Bardsley was not to be implicated in 
any way in Court or otherwise. That is Young 
could write under the Bardsley license but Bards-
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ley, the only person under bond and authorized to 
sell real estate and assume the responsibilities of 
a licensed broker, specifically refused such re-
sponsibility. 
3. No sale of the property nor any contract 
for the sale of the property was entered into dur-
!
 ing the year 1949. The Bardsley Brokerage license 
expired at the end of 1949. His right to sell real 
estate as a broker ceased and necessarily any right 
of Mr. Young to sell under the license came to an 
end with the expiration of the license. 
4. There is testimony in the record to the 
effect that in 1950, Mr. Young worked under a 
real estate brokers license issued to C. W. Powell. 
But that is immaterial because: 
^* A. Any right existing under the Bardsley 
license expired with the license. 
B. There is nothing in the record to show any 
attempted transfer or rights to Powell of 
any duties accepted by him with refer-
ence to the Buchanan listing with Young 
personally in 1949. 
C. No sale was made or contract entered 
into while the Bardsley license was valid. 
No right could be transferred to Powell 
by Young and none was transferred to 
Powell by Bardsley. If there had been, the 
h expiration of the Bardsley rights under 
his license would have the listing under 
I his license. 
5. The purported listing contract expired 
December 12, 1949. December 31st, 1949 Mr. 
Young's salesmanship license under Mr. Bardsley 
automatically expired and there was no renewal. 
6. In January Alice Buchanan told Mr. War-
ner, another real estate Broker, that the listing 
was still with Mr. Young. But in view of the fact 
that Young's license with or under Mr. Bardsley 
had expired and because of her not being party to 
any contract the statement is immaterial. 
} 
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The entire transaction was handled in harmony with 
Mr. Young acting independently of any Broker. 
The purported contract was signed by Mr. Young and 
Mr. Buchanan as individuals, nothing being said by Mr. 
Young about his arrangments with Mr. Bardsley, No 
where in the record is there any evidence of Mr. Young 
indicating to any one that he was a real estate salesman 
acting under a broker. 
The complaint, the summons, the amended complaint 
of the plaintiff and the pleadings of the defendant, includ-
ing motions and answers to complaint, are all drawn show-
ing that Mr. Young was the only interested party in the 
transaction and the only party asking judgment against the 
defendant. The case came to trial October 3rd, 1951. The 
trial was conducted on the theory that Young was the 
only interested plaintiff and the person entitled to judg-
ment against Buchanan. But at the conclusion of Plaintiff's 
testimony on the merits of the case Plaintiff interrogated 
Mr. Bardsley and then asked leave in open Court to amend 
the complaint so as to make Bardsley a party plaintiff with 
Young and asking that judgment be that the plaintiff Bards-
ley have judgment against the defendant for the use and 
benefit of plaintiff W. R. Young (Trans, p. 58-59). The 
motion was granted in open Court and on the 5th of Oct-
ober, 1951 plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which 
Mr. Bardsley was impleaded as a plaintiff praying for judg-
ment in favor of Ernest H. Bardsley for the use and benefit 
of W. R. Young. 
Thereafter the said Bardsley personally and by his 
Counsel, Carvell Mattsson, on the 8th day of November, 
A.D. 1951 moved the court for an order dismissing him 
5 
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from the action and eliminating his name as a party there-
to, and alleging that he has no interest in the subject mat-
ter; that he did not file any complaint and did not ask leave 
to become a party or authorize any one to make application 
or to act in his behalf (See motion filed Nov. 8, 1951.) 
The motion was denied. Findings of fact conclusions of 
law and judgment were entered on the 20th day of Febru-
ary, 1952 and a further order entered denying Bardsleys 
motion. 
The judgment entered February 20, 1952 is that Plaint-
iff E. H. Bardsley, for the use and benefit of the plaintiff 
W. R. Young, do have and recover of and from the defend-
ant R. H. Buchanan etc. The proceedings do not in any 
manner change the effect of the purported judgment. If 
it is anything it is Young's judgment. There is no com-
plaint filed by Bardsley, amended or otherwise, asking for 
or seeking a judgment in favor of and for his benefit. Mr. 
Young is still the active moving party in the case and is 
the real beneficiary of any judgment entered and enforced 
against defendant and appellant. 
When Mr. Bardsley talked with Mr. Young, he specifi-
cally provided under the undisputed evidence of Young and 
Bardsley that he was not to be implicated in any way 
whatsoever through Court or otherwise; that he did not 
intend to sell real estate in 1949, and that Young was to be 
responsible for all sales. The expression ("Young could sell 
under his license") became meaningless and the relationship 
is unknown to the law. 
When Bardsley learned of judgment entered he em-
ployed counsel to secure a dismissal from the action. The 
motion was denied. He was named as another plaintiff and 
6 
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thereby is made the stooge or dummy by which plaintiff 
proposes to enforce rights against the defendant which he 
did not in fact have and which he has no right to assert, 
legally or otherwise. 
The Statute in force at the time of these transactions 
provided: 
"It shall be unlawful for any real estate salesman 
to accept a commission or other valuable consider-
ation for the performance of any of the acts herein 
specified from any person except his employer who 
must be a licensed real estate broker." 
Section 82-2-10 U.C.A. 1943. 
Had Mr. Buchanan offered to pay a valuable consider-
ation or commission to Mr. Young for the acts Young alleg-
es and claims he performed for Mr. Buchanan, it would 
have been unlawful for Young to receive it. How can there 
be valid judgment enforcing the unlawful act. If Young 
could not voluntarily receive, how can he be beneficiary of 
judgment in his favor? 
Agreements in violation of positive law are illegal and 
void: 17 C.J. Section 555, under "contracts". 
"Courts will not enforce a cause of action 
arising out of an illegal transaction nor entertain 
an action for a division of the proceeds of such 
transaction. This is undoubtedly the rule, and this 
Court has gone farther, holding that not only 
must the action fail where the evidence of plaint-
iff discloses that his cause is based on an illegal 
or immoral transaction, but that the defendant 
may allege and prove the illegality or immorality 
of the transaction and the Court will then refuse 
its aid to either party, leaving them where it finds 
them." 
7 
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Obradovitch v Walker Brothers Bankers 
80 Utah 587-602 
Haddock v Salt Lake City, 23 Utah 521 
"No principle of law is better settled than a 
party to an illegal contract cannot come into a 
Court of Law and ask to have his illegal objects 
carried out. Nor can he set up a case in which he 
must necessarily disclose an illegal purpose as the 
Ground Work of his claim.,, 
13 C. J. Page 492, Section 440, Contracts. 
The Statutes further provide: 
"Any person violating any of the provisions of 
this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, and . . . . 
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $50.00 
and not more than $299.00, or by imprisonment 
in the County jail not to exceed six months, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment." 
It might well be suggested that the favor Buchanan did 
Young in refusing to make the demanded payment probably 
kept him out of jail for a term for which, in equity and 
justice, Mr. Young might well reimburse Mr. Buchanan, at 
least to the amount of the fine that might have been levied 
on him. 
It is also provided in Section 82-2-3: 
"The term real estate salesman shall mean and 
include any person employed or engaged by or on 
behalf of a licensed real estate broker to do or 
deal in any act or transaction set out or compre-
hended by the definition of a real estate broker in 
section 82-2-2 for compensation or otherwise." 
and by 82-2-3: 
"A real estate broker includes all persons 
who for another and for a fee, commission or 
other valuable consideration or who with the in-
tention or expectancy or upon the promise of re-
ceiving or collecting a fee, commission or other 
valuable consideration, sells or offers to sell real 
estate . . . . " 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The testimony of Mr. Young is that he was a licensed 
real estate salesman. As to the employment, his employer, 
E. H. Bardsley, testified that Young inquired of him if 
he could write under Bardsley's commission and Bardsley 
told Young he could sell under his license with the under-
standing that he, Young, was responsible for all sales and 
that he, Bardsley, was not to be implicated in any way 
through Court or otherwise. There is no other evidence 
relative to the employment of Young by Bardsley. 
If that conversation constituted Young a real estate 
salesman under Bardsley, then it follows that Young was 
in fact in the employ of Bardsley and he had no right to 
receive compensation from Buchanan. The purported list-
ing contract entered i ^ if 
It had any effect, created a listing agreement with Bards-
ley and Young had no right to enforce it. 
Although Bardsley stated to Young that he wasi to have 
the commissions, it could not create a privity of contract 
between Young and Buchanan because that would be a 
violation of the statutory provisions that the real estate 
salesman had no right to enforce. 
If Young was in fact a real estate salesman employed 
by Bardsley, then although there is no evidence of the fur-
ther facts, it would have to be assumed that he otherwise 
complied with the Statutory provisions relative to sales-
mans license; That is that he, in addition to his application, 
stated who his last employee was, the length of time he had 
been engaged, the name of the person then employing him 
and the name of the person whose employ he is about to 
enter, and that his application was accompanied by a state-
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ment from Bardsley recommending that the license bo 
granted. The license would have been issued showing the 
name of the real estate broker and would have been mailed 
to the broker and kept in the custody and control of Mr. 
Bardsley. When Mr. Bardsley's brokers license was revoked, 
as it was, at the end of 1949, Mr. Young's license was sus-
pended pending the change of employer and the issuance 
of a new license. When the license of Mr. Young terminated 
at the end of 1949 under Mr. Bardsley as Broker, it be-
came Bardsley's duty to deliver or mail to the commission 
Young's real estate salesman's license, and Mr. Bardsley's 
authority to deal in real estate having expired, his contract 
with Mr. Buchanan also expired, and Young's authority 
under Bardsley ceased. Section 82-2-8 U.C.A. 1943. 
Again: Section 82-2-9 provides: 
"The revocation of a broker's license shall auto-
matically suspend every salesman's license granted 
to any person by virtue of his employment by the 
broker whose license has been revoked, pending the 
change of employer and the issuance of a new 
license. 
Bardsley's license as a real estate broker expired Dec-
ember 31st, 1949 and the revocation automatically suspend-
ed Young's license, there being neither broker nor salesman. 
It seems to follow that the Buchanan contract which expir-
ed December 12, 1949, also lost it's force. 
If the listing set out in the Young-Buchanan memor-
andum has any effect it must be construed as a listing with 
the Broker. Bardsley had the power of enforcement, he was 
liable to Young for his compensation and Young's right of 
action if he had any was against Bardsley and not against 
Buchanan. If Bardsley had a right of action against Buch-
10 
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anan it was in his own right and not for the use and bene-
fit of Young. The commission earned, if any, may have been 
the measure of Young's rights against Bardsley, but in 
view of Statute, his claims, if any, were against his broker, 
not against the owner who, under the law, had listed with 
the broker, if any one. In view of the statutory provisions, 
if Buchanan is liable to any one it is the broker and a 
judgment improperly rendered against Buchanan in this 
action would not be a bar to Bardsley bringing his action 
in his own right against Buchanan. In other words, if un-
der these proceedings, this judgment is upheld, then Bu-
chanan becomes subject to a double liability. 
But Bardsley, at the time Young Claims to have in-
quired of Bardsley whether Young could write under his 
commission, stated that Young was to be responsible for 
all sales and that he, Bardsley, was not to be implicated in 
any way, in Court or otherwise. But the essence of the 
legal relationship created when a broker employs a sales-
man is that the listing is with the broker; it is the broker 
who represents the owner in making the sales; it is the 
broker who is authorized to complete and fill out such 
forms or legal documents as may be necessary, to which 
the broker is a party as agent of the vendor, not the sales-
man. 
That Young did not purport to comply with these 
statutory provisions is demonstrated by the fact that he 
took the listing in his own name; he claimed right of com-
pensation personally from Buchanan; he brought action to 
recover a fee he was not entitled to under the law; he 
filed an amended complaint still asking for an unlawful 
11 
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recovery from Buchanan, and then to avoid the unlawful 
situation he asked to make Bardsley a party plaintiff and 
that judgment be entered in his favor for the use of Young. 
That is; Young merely asked the Court to make Bardsley a 
party plaintiff so Young could use him in enforcing the un-
lawful contract he had entered into. 
Judgment was in fact entered that plaintiff E. H. 
Bardsley, for the use and benefit of plaintiff Young do 
have and recover of and from the Defendant etc. It is a 
plain case of attempting to do by indirection what cannot 
be done directly. If there is any cause of action pleaded or 
found by the Court, it is an action existing at the time 
of bringing the action in favor of the Broker Bardsley and 
not in favor of the plaintiff Young. To say it is in favor 
of Bardsley for the use of Young is denying the fair im-
port of all the facts. The statutes authorize Bardsley to 
sell real estate for a commission. They also authorize him 
to employ a salesman to assist the broker in making sales 
and to compensate the salesman for such assistance. But 
the salesman has no right to ask any one other than the 
broker who employs him for his compensation. 
If the purported listing agreement were to be given 
any binding effect under the law, it must be by reading 
into it provisions not found in the instrument and not talk-
ed of by the parties at any time to the bringing of this 
action, or thereafter until trial was had, that the instru-
ment, although executed by Young, was, in fact, for the 
use and benefit of Bardsley. That is substituting a wholly 
new cause of action that could not be established by evid-
ence establishing a cause of action in Young, had the con-
tract not been illegal. 
12 
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In Hallett vs Parrish, an Idaho Case reported in 51 pac, 
page 108, the Court says:
 : , 
"Under the very liberal provisions of our stat-
ute, a Court should not permit a person to be sub-
. stituted as plaintiff in the place of the plaintiff 
who brought the suit when the person substituted 
was the real and only party in interest at the 
commencement of the suit." 
For still stronger reasons, it seems to the writer, that 
a person ought not be brought into a cause as a substituted 
party, or additional plaintiff, at the request of the original 
plaintiff with the view of compelling the real party in in-
terest to prosecute an action for the use and benefit of the 
original party plaintiff, where it develops, as in this case, 
that original party plaintiff had no cause of action in fact, 
where the claimed cause of action, as to the original party 
plaintiff, was illegal and unenforcible, and where, if the 
claimed cause of action were enforced, it would have the 
effect of the original plaintiff using the Courts to enforce 
a payment to the original plaintiff that would make him 
guilty of crime in accepting the payment or satisfaction of 
the judgment. 
Finally; The law makes it illegal for the original plaint-
iff to enforce payment, were there an enforcible 
contract. 
The fact that the impleaded plaintiff had no 
contractual rights as against the defendant, that 
he expressly refused to accept any responsibility 
as broker, and that, long prior to the sale of the 
property to King, Bardsley's license as a broker 
had expired, denies him the right to judgment, 
13 
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either personally or for the use and benefit of the 
original plaintiff. 
With All Duplications and Repetitions, 
Respectfully Submitted, 
N. J. BATES, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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